Assessing HAMP a year later

H A M P—Home Affordable Loan Modification Program was discussed in detail yesterday. If you missed it, it would be valuable to read it before you read today's blog.

First, let’s analyze what has been accomplished under the program. The program was projected to reach over 4 million homeowners with much needed help to sustain home ownership. The end of the year report indicates that fewer than 100,000 have, in fact, been granted permanent (5 year permanent) mortgage modifications since the program was implemented in March, 2009. For those 100,000 or so, they see it as a success (even if they do feel 20 years older because of the process). I feel pretty sure that the other 3,900,000 would consider it a failure. The horror stories of run-arounds, and lost paperwork and so on and so forth defies explanation and even the most mild-mannered person can be pushed too far.

Why Has HAMP failed?

The simple reasons are that it was created without a clear understanding of how the bank world works (the role of the guarantor behind the loan) and some other critical components were just overlooked.

Capacity—The dilluge of consumers instantaneously seeking help totally overwhelmed servicing shops who were already stretched past capacity because of defaults. Without funding for the hiring and training for substantial increases in staff to handle the flood of requests for help, the plan was doomed to be as ineffective as history has shown it to be. Individual lenders have sent PR teams across the country to talk about the way they handle modifications, but I am talking about a massive, organized, on-going effort to train the staff within the lender shops what was expected from the government and how the program was to be implemented. For a simple look at the capacity issue—I have folks tell me all the time, “You should be offering this and you should be doing that and why aren’t you answering questions online from individual borrowers?” I look at them like they’re crazy. HOM is a small company with 3 employees and the company’s income is generated almost exclusively from speaker fees. You want production equilvalent to a large company but you are not offering any funding or staffing just creating more jobs. The NEED for something does not translate into the CAPACITY to provide it without resources which include funding and personnel. HAMP did not adequately address the capacity to get the job done.

Resources—The expectation that only HUD approved housing agencies or similar non-profits should be the ONLY endorsed sources for help totally belies the fact that the program was designed for borrowers with mortgage balances up to $725,000 and non-profits primarily restrict their services to folks who earn less than middle income. Hence, no provision for a referral to anyone if you are not at the lowest end of the income spectrum. Worse, a condemnation (by our President no less) of any organization which offers help for a fee (to middle and upper income borrowers who are looking for such help). This major oversight means there were no guidelines, training, or criteria established for this needed service and YES, some vultures stepped in to fill the gap. California now has some pretty strong anti-vulture legislation which pushed most of the loan modification businesses there out of business, and not a day too soon for many of borrowers who have found that un-trained and un-regulated help can lead to a diastrous outcome.

Non-Profit Push Back

I understand that I am inviting non-profits to yell at me but before you start yelling to defend your position as the only people who care—What is your current back log? How many more people could you see? Is your staff already maxed out? Have all of your counselors received substantial modification and foreclosure law education in your state? Do you offer a sliding scale so any homeowner, any income level has access to your services? What is your success rate with completed modifications? Are borrowers re-defaulting within a few months? If the answer to any of those questions is yes, this indicate you are already serving your maximum capacity (and I am informed enough to know that most are). Stop arguing that help should ONLY be available to those whom you serve and embrace the idea that all borrowers, all income levels deserve to have representation to help them with the crazy world of banking. Businesses which have trained staff, operated ethically, with sufficient government regulations and appropriate bonds in place could go a long way to easing the foreclosure problem which continues to plague this county and will for the next several years. The time has come for the creation of Foreclosure Intervention Services—For Hire, as respectable businesses, listed in the phone book right next to non-profits as a resource for struggling borrowers. Repeat after me—Prohibition did not stop folks from getting alcohol—it just made the bootleg market prosper. When are we going to learn? Where there is a need—a provider will emerge.

Program Lacked Basic Understanding of the Bank World

It was a VOLUNTARY program. Lenders were not required to participate. In fact, they could NOT be forced to participate. It is not possible to force someone to alter the terms of a contractual agreement AFTER the fact. It doesn’t matter that the entity trying to compel cooperation was the US government. Mortgages are legally binding contracts. Lenders already had not only the contract with the borrower, but contracts with the investor, the guarantor, the hedge fund, and so on. The performance of one contract impacted several other contracts and therefore made it nearly impossible to make a significant change to the original contract (the mortgage) because of the cascading impact on all the other contracts which had grown out of the securitization of the underlying contract. Formulating a plan without a clearcut understanding of the securitization process was a major misstep in trying to implement HAMP.

Motivation Insufficient

Beyond the securitization problem, the issue of sufficient motivation to modify made the challenge almost insurmountable. While many would argue that the lenders were paid for their cooperation, that argument fails to address what they would receive by NOT cooperating. Now lenders are going to be mad when I state emphatically that they receive MORE to foreclose than they do to modify. How could that be you ask. Lenders lose money DURING the default process: they must pay the investor as agreed, incur expenses associated with the servicing of the loan, work to avoid having a lien placed against the property for failure to pay homeowners’ association dues, cover the cost of insurance to avoid an uninsured loss, etc, etc. All of these are out-of-pocket expenses—UNTIL a foreclosure is completed. Then, on ALL insured loans, which is MOST of them, the lender recoups many of the expenses which they have put out and collect the amount of the insurance on the loan. It is true that they will seldom get back the missed payments (that remains a loss to them) but the other expenses are usually reimbursable expenses. If you’ve wondered why it seems that the lender is not really trying to work with you, simply consider they need the process to be over, so a claim can be filed.

HAFA—A New Program announced on November 30, 2009 will be addressed next week.

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