Reflections on the Home Affordable Loan Modification Program

The Obama Administration announced the H A M P program with great fanfare on March 4, 2009. It was a bold step to address the foreclosure problem which was clearly swirling out of control. $75 Billion committed to reducing loan payments. Projected to help more than 4 million homeowners.

It Began With a Premise

Foreclosures in the country were occurring at break neck speed and something had to be done. The plan was conceived based on the premise that homeowners would pay their mortgages—IF they could. Despite being upside-down, borrowers are committed to retaining their home. Warren Buffet has been quoted as saying “Commentary on the current housing crises often ignores the crucial fact that most foreclosures do not occur because a house is worth less than it’s mortgage (upside down). Rather, foreclosure takes place because borrowers can’t pay the monthly payment they agreed to pay.” It is a premise with which I agree and an honorable premise on which to craft a resolution.

A Look At the Program

H A M P or Home Affordable Loan Modification Program was launched with the specific and ambitious goal of making sure that millions of Americans would have the opportunity to remain in their homes even though market dynamics and other factors beyond their control meant the value of the property had declined AND they were struggling with payments but they wanted to keep their home. The goals were clear, the mandate receiving strong support. It seemed a good thing—for all the right reasons.

Reduction in Payment

To address the ‘ability to pay’ the H A M P plan provided guidelines for getting those payments under control. Conservative banking guidelines for many years had shown that mortgage payments at no more than 31% of a borrower’s income usually prove to be sustainable so that OLD underwriting guideline was used as a benchmark for what should be the new goal to help us get out of this mess.

To accomplish this, lenders and their servicing partners were provided with guidelines to make this happen:

a. First, Reduce the payment amount so that it was no more than 31% of the borrower’s monthly income

b. Reduce the interest rate to as low as 2% as a way to get the payment down farther

c. Extend the term of the loan—up to 40 years—further reducing the monthly payment

d. If the payment amount was still more than 31% of the borrower’s monthly income, THEN funds from the H A M P fund would be used to pay whatever was needed to get the payment down to 31% of monthly income

Adjusting the principle balance was not an option addressed by this plan even though it was a logical step (in the opinion of this writer) and had been the objective of the ‘cram down’ component of the bankruptcy reform legislation defeated late in 2008.

Criteria for Participation

H A M P was created as an option for owner-occupied properties with outstanding balances of $729,750 or less. The homeowner was required to demonstrate a hardship caused by a factor or factors beyond their control. It applied to loans originated prior to January 1, 2009. Modified payments were set up for 3 months, as a test to see if the borrower could afford the new payment.

If they made that threshold, then the loan modification became permanent (for 5 years, so let’s say, semi-permanent).

Investors or speculators were exempted from participations. So if you had bought into the hype that building a piece of America was the way to financial security, you were on your own. Consequently, it was expected by a number of observers that the number of foreclosures in this segment would rise dramatically, and RISE they have.

Incentives

In order to facilitate this voluntary program, the H A M P initiative provided for financial inducement to all parties to participate. Servicers (and/or the lenders whom they represented) were to receive $1,000 for each completed modification. The plan called for an additional $1,000 for each year the modification remained in place with a cap after 3 years. The borrower could get $1,000 off their principal balance for each year, up to five years.

“Net Present Value” Test

In order to determine which loans should be modified, lenders/servicers were to conduct a ‘net present value’ test. The test was supposed to compare the expected cash flow which would be generated under the program (with a modified, performing loan) as compared with the expected cash flow if the loan were not modified (and continued non-performing if the borrower were already in default). Let’s see, some $ paid, versus $0 paid. Not a hard test really. Seems like a no-brainer to me.

Good intentions for a worthy cause. So how did it go wrong. Why have consumers across the country been yelling fowl by the hundreds of thousands? Why has the Administration acknowledged that the program has not reached nearly the scope that they projected? We’ll provide those assessments in tomorrow’s blog. Don’t miss it.

Copyright © 2008, Home Ownership Matters, LLC. All Rights Reserved.

(Please E-mail Heather at homeownershipmatters@gmail.com with any questions, comments or concerns you might have! We appreciate all comments and feedback, so please don't be shy.)

Assessing HAMP a year later

H A M P—Home Affordable Loan Modification Program was discussed in detail yesterday. If you missed it, it would be valuable to read it before you read today's blog.

First, let’s analyze what has been accomplished under the program. The program was projected to reach over 4 million homeowners with much needed help to sustain home ownership. The end of the year report indicates that fewer than 100,000 have, in fact, been granted permanent (5 year permanent) mortgage modifications since the program was implemented in March, 2009. For those 100,000 or so, they see it as a success (even if they do feel 20 years older because of the process). I feel pretty sure that the other 3,900,000 would consider it a failure. The horror stories of run-arounds, and lost paperwork and so on and so forth defies explanation and even the most mild-mannered person can be pushed too far.

Why Has HAMP failed?

The simple reasons are that it was created without a clear understanding of how the bank world works (the role of the guarantor behind the loan) and some other critical components were just overlooked.

Capacity—The dilluge of consumers instantaneously seeking help totally overwhelmed servicing shops who were already stretched past capacity because of defaults. Without funding for the hiring and training for substantial increases in staff to handle the flood of requests for help, the plan was doomed to be as ineffective as history has shown it to be. Individual lenders have sent PR teams across the country to talk about the way they handle modifications, but I am talking about a massive, organized, on-going effort to train the staff within the lender shops what was expected from the government and how the program was to be implemented. For a simple look at the capacity issue—I have folks tell me all the time, “You should be offering this and you should be doing that and why aren’t you answering questions online from individual borrowers?” I look at them like they’re crazy. HOM is a small company with 3 employees and the company’s income is generated almost exclusively from speaker fees. You want production equilvalent to a large company but you are not offering any funding or staffing just creating more jobs. The NEED for something does not translate into the CAPACITY to provide it without resources which include funding and personnel. HAMP did not adequately address the capacity to get the job done.

Resources—The expectation that only HUD approved housing agencies or similar non-profits should be the ONLY endorsed sources for help totally belies the fact that the program was designed for borrowers with mortgage balances up to $725,000 and non-profits primarily restrict their services to folks who earn less than middle income. Hence, no provision for a referral to anyone if you are not at the lowest end of the income spectrum. Worse, a condemnation (by our President no less) of any organization which offers help for a fee (to middle and upper income borrowers who are looking for such help). This major oversight means there were no guidelines, training, or criteria established for this needed service and YES, some vultures stepped in to fill the gap. California now has some pretty strong anti-vulture legislation which pushed most of the loan modification businesses there out of business, and not a day too soon for many of borrowers who have found that un-trained and un-regulated help can lead to a diastrous outcome.

Non-Profit Push Back

I understand that I am inviting non-profits to yell at me but before you start yelling to defend your position as the only people who care—What is your current back log? How many more people could you see? Is your staff already maxed out? Have all of your counselors received substantial modification and foreclosure law education in your state? Do you offer a sliding scale so any homeowner, any income level has access to your services? What is your success rate with completed modifications? Are borrowers re-defaulting within a few months? If the answer to any of those questions is yes, this indicate you are already serving your maximum capacity (and I am informed enough to know that most are). Stop arguing that help should ONLY be available to those whom you serve and embrace the idea that all borrowers, all income levels deserve to have representation to help them with the crazy world of banking. Businesses which have trained staff, operated ethically, with sufficient government regulations and appropriate bonds in place could go a long way to easing the foreclosure problem which continues to plague this county and will for the next several years. The time has come for the creation of Foreclosure Intervention Services—For Hire, as respectable businesses, listed in the phone book right next to non-profits as a resource for struggling borrowers. Repeat after me—Prohibition did not stop folks from getting alcohol—it just made the bootleg market prosper. When are we going to learn? Where there is a need—a provider will emerge.

Program Lacked Basic Understanding of the Bank World

It was a VOLUNTARY program. Lenders were not required to participate. In fact, they could NOT be forced to participate. It is not possible to force someone to alter the terms of a contractual agreement AFTER the fact. It doesn’t matter that the entity trying to compel cooperation was the US government. Mortgages are legally binding contracts. Lenders already had not only the contract with the borrower, but contracts with the investor, the guarantor, the hedge fund, and so on. The performance of one contract impacted several other contracts and therefore made it nearly impossible to make a significant change to the original contract (the mortgage) because of the cascading impact on all the other contracts which had grown out of the securitization of the underlying contract. Formulating a plan without a clearcut understanding of the securitization process was a major misstep in trying to implement HAMP.

Motivation Insufficient

Beyond the securitization problem, the issue of sufficient motivation to modify made the challenge almost insurmountable. While many would argue that the lenders were paid for their cooperation, that argument fails to address what they would receive by NOT cooperating. Now lenders are going to be mad when I state emphatically that they receive MORE to foreclose than they do to modify. How could that be you ask. Lenders lose money DURING the default process: they must pay the investor as agreed, incur expenses associated with the servicing of the loan, work to avoid having a lien placed against the property for failure to pay homeowners’ association dues, cover the cost of insurance to avoid an uninsured loss, etc, etc. All of these are out-of-pocket expenses—UNTIL a foreclosure is completed. Then, on ALL insured loans, which is MOST of them, the lender recoups many of the expenses which they have put out and collect the amount of the insurance on the loan. It is true that they will seldom get back the missed payments (that remains a loss to them) but the other expenses are usually reimbursable expenses. If you’ve wondered why it seems that the lender is not really trying to work with you, simply consider they need the process to be over, so a claim can be filed.

HAFA—A New Program announced on November 30, 2009 will be addressed next week.

Copyright © 2008, Home Ownership Matters, LLC. All Rights Reserved.

(Please E-mail Heather at homeownershipmatters@gmail.com with any questions, comments or concerns you might have! We appreciate all comments and feedback, so please don't be shy.)